In the wake of its return to public political life following the events of August 5, 2024, Jamaat-e-Islami has embarked on a multifaceted process of internal reform not merely as an organisational exercise, but as a strategic recalibration aimed at navigating an increasingly hostile political and social environment.
Once defined by rigid ideological orthodoxy and a clear distance from nationalist narratives, the party is now cautiously repositioning itself through symbolic gestures, policy adjustments, and structural changes that signal a departure from past postures while still insisting its Islamic foundations remain unshaken.
Evolution in party charter: From sharia to welfare state
Perhaps the most significant ideological shift is embedded in the party’s constitutional documents.
The 2006 preamble explicitly framed Jamaat’s mission as establishing “the law of Allah in every aspect… of the state” to build an Islamic society.
But the version revised in 2019 and reprinted in December 2023 reflects a markedly different tone.
It now grounds the party’s purpose in Bangladesh’s sovereignty as “an independent and sovereign nation-state” achieved through “the heroic struggle of the people of Bangladesh and freedom fighters,” with the goal of building “a society based on justice and equity, free from exploitation.”
This rewording – dropping explicit references to Sharia and foregrounding national liberation – marks a quiet but profound realignment, suggesting an effort to reconcile Islamic identity with Bangladeshi nationalism.
A new visual identity: Patriotism over partisanship?
Perhaps the most visible shift lies in the party’s evolving visual language. Over the past year, observers have noted a consistent use of red and green – the colours of Bangladesh’s national flag – in Jamaat’s public events.
From stage backdrops at Suhrawardy Udyan to banners, posters, and festoons at rallies across the country, the national palette has replaced the party’s traditional green-and-white scheme.
Most strikingly, during a recent meeting between Jamaat Amir Dr Shafiqur Rahman and the Spanish ambassador in Dhaka, a new emblem was displayed on the wall behind him: a stylised logo bearing a clear resemblance to the national flag, notably omitting the Quranic text that once defined the party’s identity.
While the party insists the logo is not yet final, its appearance has ignited debate both within and outside Jamaat. Critics allege it is an attempt to “secularise” the party’s image or court Western approval.
Supporters counter that it is a pragmatic move to align with national sentiment and counter decades of being branded “anti-liberation.” As one unnamed member of the Central Majlis-e-Shura told Jago News: “No party can be completely read with a logo. The logo will be in line with our basic principles… Earlier, we did not have an official logo, so something new is coming.”
The lingering shadow of 1971
At the heart of Jamaat’s existential challenge remains its historical stance on the 1971 Liberation War. Long accused of collaboration with Pakistani forces, the party has faced renewed scrutiny since re-entering the political arena.
The issue resurfaced dramatically after leaders of its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, visited the Shaheed Buddhujibi Smriti Saudh in Rayerbazar following their victory in the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU) elections and said prayers at the memorial. The gesture, intended as reconciliation, instead intensified internal divisions.
Discussions about issuing a formal apology or acknowledgment have gained traction within the leadership.
However, consensus remains elusive. Maulana Abdul Halim, central assistant secretary general and executive council member, acknowledged: “We have discussions on ’71 issues. Even if a decision is made in the executive council on any fundamental issue, it has to be passed by our Majlis-e-Shura. Everyone in Jamaat has to agree on fundamental issues.”
Another senior leader, speaking anonymously, captured the dilemma: “An attempt is being made to defeat Jamaat and Shibir with the ’71 issues… But the people of the country do not believe in this tagging politics now. Therefore, this issue will remain for life. It is difficult to make a decision on this issue.”
Electoral pragmatism: Relaxing the ‘rukn’ standard
In preparation for the 13th national parliamentary elections, Jamaat is also relaxing its long-standing candidate selection criteria. Traditionally, only top-ranking cadres whom the party calls “Rukn (pillar)” were eligible for nomination.
Now, the party is prioritising competence, integrity, and public trust over formal status. This shift is exemplified by the nomination of Haji Hafez Enayet Ullah, a businessman and a mere activist of Jamaat, as its candidate for Dhaka-7.
Mubarak Hossain, central executive council member and southern region supervisor, explained: “Our target is competent and just people. Those who will protect people’s deposits without corruption. In that case, there will be no question whether s/he is a Rukn of simple activist.”
He added that policy adaptation is natural: “Every party has to go through trial and error. Efforts are made to adapt that policy. Otherwise, changes are made… We are making changes according to the social situation while keeping the fundamental issues of Islam intact.”
Empowering women: A strategic imperative
Recognising that nearly half the electorate is female, Jamaat is also intensifying efforts to mobilise women. Its women’s wing operates a three-tier structure: associate members, workers, and rukns (the highest rank). The party claims 50,000 rukns, 4,00,000 women workers, and a vast network of associates—making up 40 per cent of its estimated one million total members.
Abdul Halim noted: “Women's interest in voting is increasing… Our work is aimed at that. Women are working on the basic demands of Islam. The number of women's rukns will increase more than men in the next few years.”
Reform or rebranding?
Jamaat’s reforms reflect a party caught between principle and survival. While leaders insist that core Islamic tenets remain untouched, the cumulative effect of symbolic, constitutional, and strategic changes suggests a broader effort to shed its pariah status and re-enter the mainstream.
Whether this represents genuine ideological evolution or tactical rebranding remains contested. But in a political climate where legitimacy is increasingly tied to national identity, Jamaat appears to be betting that patriotism, even if performed, may be its path back to relevance.